The exploits of bug hunters

Article tiré du magazine The Economist.

Bug exploit

Trading in software flaws is a booming business

TO HELP shield their products from ransomware like the recent worldwide WannaCry attack, most big software-makers pay “bug bounties” to those who report vulnerabilities in their products that need to be patched. Payouts of up to $20,000 are common. Google’s bounties reach $200,000, says Billy Rios, a former member of that firm’s award panel. This may sound like good money for finding a programming oversight, but it is actually “ridiculously low” according to Chaouki Bekrar, boss of Zerodium, a firm in Washington, DC, that is a dealer in “exploits”, as programs which take advantage of vulnerabilities are known.

Last September Zerodium’s payment rates for exploits that hack iPhones tripled, from $500,000 to $1.5m. Yuriy Gurkin, the boss of Gleg, an exploit-broker in Moscow, tells a similar story. Mundane exploits for web browsers, which might, a few years ago, have fetched $5,000 or so, are now, he says, worth “several dozen thousand”. Unsurprisingly, Zerodium and Gleg are not alone in the market. Philippe Langlois, head of P1 Security, a Parisian firm, reckons there are more than 200 exploit brokers in the world.

Such brokers buy exploits from freelance hackers, who make a profitable hobby out of searching for vulnerabilities. They then sell them to those who can use them. Some, Zerodium and Gleg among them, are perfectly respectable, and choosy about whom they deal with (Zerodium says it declines more sales than it makes). Government agencies in America and western Europe, in particular, are eager customers. Others are less scrupulous. For example, e-mails posted to WikiLeaks in 2015 show that Hacking Team, a Milanese broker, sold exploits to Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, none of which has a sparkling record of democracy and freedom.

Exploits are also sold in shadowy online markets, where customers are often out-and-out criminals. At some point, no doubt, WannaCry changed hands this way. Nor is that lack of doubt rhetorical, for monitoring activity in the nether parts of the web can, and in this case did, offer omens of trouble to come.

Just as someone will sell you an exploit, so someone else will sell you a warning. One such is CYR3CON, in Phoenix, Arizona. This firm produces reports of possible threats, based on the results of its software sifting automatically through the online writings, in 15 languages, of hackers involved in the field.

On April 15th, a month before WannaCry began freezing data on Windows-based computers, CYR3CON’s software picked up chatter about exploits designed for just that task. Eleven days later, it highlighted exchanges about one such exploit that had been installed but not yet activated on more than 62,000 computers. Many were in medical facilities that had previously paid up “without unnecessary conversations”. Forewarned, those who had been using CYR3CON’s services could take precautions. Others were not so fortunate.

 

From the print edition